Animal liberation and the lessons of nature by Sapontzis, Steve F.
UC Agriculture & Natural Resources
Proceedings of the Vertebrate Pest Conference
Title
Animal liberation and the lessons of nature
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5ss1754d
Journal
Proceedings of the Vertebrate Pest Conference, 17(17)
ISSN
0507-6773
Author
Sapontzis, Steve F.
Publication Date
1996
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
ANIMAL LIBERATION AND THE LESSONS OF NATURE 
STEVE F. SAPONTZIS, Department of Philosophy, California State University, Hayward, California 94542. 
KEY WORDS: ethics, animal liberation, animal rights 
Although they provide catchy labels, "animal 
liberation" and "animal rights" have occasioned 
considerable misunderstanding and much pointless debate. 
I want, here, to explicate what I believe is being sought 
for animals under these labels. This explication should 
help to undo some of the misunderstandings about 
liberating animals and extending moral rights to them. 
After this explication, I will tum to the issue of the way 
in which scientific knowledge of natural entities, 
processes. and organizations is and is not relevant to 
animal liberation. 
PART I: WHAT ANIMAL LIBERATION IS ABOUT 
One of these misunderstandings concerns the use of 
"animal" in these labels. At most animal liberation 
presentations, there is someone who rises to inquire 
whether flies, cockroaches, and other vermin are to enjoy 
rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Is 
swatting a fly to be murder in the brave New World of 
animal rights? This heckler is soon joined, if not 
preceded, by another who accuses the animal liberationist 
of discriminating against plants and, consequently. being 
guilty of "fauna chauvinism." Do the arguments for 
animal liberation entail plant liberation as well? Of 
course, these hecklers are not sincere activists in the 
mosquito and tomato liberation movements. What they 
are attempting to do is to dispose of the animal liberation 
movement through a reductio ad absurdum argument. As 
William James noted many years ago, the first response 
to a revolutionary idea is ridicule. 
The insect and flora reductios will not work, 
however, because most animal liberationists accept what 
has come to be called "the interest requirement" for 
having moral rights. According to this criterion, which 
was first proposed by Leonard Nelson in A System of 
Ethics, all and only beings with interests can have moral 
rights (Yale University Press 1956). Having interests is 
to be interpreted as follows: an individual has an interest 
in something if and only if that something affects (will 
affect, would affect) the individual's feelings of well-
being. In tum, "feelings of well-being" is to be 
interpreted as referring to pleasure and pain, feeling fit 
and feeling ill, elation and depression, feelings of 
fulfillment and feelings of frustration, and the many other 
feelings which contribute to or detract from the enjoyment 
of or satisfaction with life. Now. the "animal" in "animal 
liberation" and "animal rights" refers to all and only those 
beings which meet the interest requirement. The phrase 
"sentient being" is often employed to make this reference. 
Thus, the criterion for being an "animal," in this 
moral sense, is not the biological criterion which 
distinguishes fauna from flora. Nor are animal 
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liberationists confused about this, since most of them 
readily acknowledge that very probably not all biological 
animals have interests and, consequently, cannot have 
moral rights. As for the insects and the plants, all those 
which can meet the interest requirement must, if animal 
liberationists are to be consistent, be included in the 
concerns of this movement. However, to date, there has 
been no serious evidence showing that plants have 
feelings of well-being. Whether or which insects have 
interests is a more open question. 
It does not follow from this, however. that the insect 
reductio carries the day against animal liberation. If 
some insects have feelings of well-being, then a morality 
which attempts to respect all sentient beings will be more 
complicated than it would be if no insects were sentient. 
Of course, this sort of consequence is true of all 
moralities; the more diverse the group owed respect, the 
more complicated the morality must be. For example, 
dealing morally with one's "fellows" is more complicated 
now that women and racial and ethnic minorities are 
included among the rights-holders due respect. To one 
degree or another, we probably all share a yearning for 
a simpler life, but that practicing a revolutionary morality 
would be more complicated than resting content with the 
status quo does not indicate that revolutionary morality is 
ridiculous, wrong, or even less warranted than the status 
quo. 
Furthermore, acknowledging that some insects have 
moral rights would not by itself resolve the matter of how 
we are to deal with them, especially in conflict of interest 
situations. Since to have moral rights is not necessarily 
to have the same set of rights as or equal priority of 
rights with other rights-holders, extending moral rights to 
those who have not enjoyed them before does not settle 
the matter of how we are to treat them. Rather. it opens 
the door to questions about how we ought (morally) to 
treat them which had not previously seemed relevant 
(Caplan 1983). For example, the Emancipation 
Proclamation was not the culmination but the beginning 
of the civil rights movement. Also, in attempting to 
answer these new questions about how we ought (morally) 
to treat animals, if simple applications of ideas of 
equality, self-determination, and similar concepts 
commonly associated with liberation and rights would be 
ridiculous, then we can expect that those simple 
applications will, for that very reason, be rejected. This 
is what has happened in working out other liberation 
movements (e.g., the recent rejection of the claim that an 
end to sexual discrimination entails that male workers are 
entitled to maternity leave). In actual practice, ridiculous 
consequences do not discredit the basic principles of 
moral reform; rather, such consequences lead to a more 
subtle and practical understanding of those principles-
an understanding which eliminates the ridiculous 
consequences. 
Finally, we may note that although these "where do 
you draw the line" questions may be amusing and 
conceptually intriguing, they are irrelevant to the current, 
major, practical concerns of the animal liberation 
movement (e.g.. the immorality of factory farming, 
animal research, hunting, rodeos, etc.). If any non-
human animals have interests, then the animals (e.g .. 
pigs, monkeys, bears, horses, etc.) that the animal rights 
movement is currently seeking to liberate surely do. 
Once the questions currently being raised concerning how 
we ought (morally) to treat these animals have been 
settled, it may be time to wonder whether insects have 
moral rights, need to be liberated, and what form such an 
enlightened morality should take. To bring up the 
question of insects before these current questions have 
been resolved is merely an attempt to avoid facing the 
real and clear issues at hand. 
"Liberation" also requires some explication when 
applied to animals. Advocates of liberating or extending 
moral rights to animals view this extension as being a 
revolutionary break with moral tradition. including the 
anti-cruelty to animals part of that tradition, and as 
providing for animals something of great moral 
importance. The predominant attitude regarding animal 
interests today is that what animals require for an 
enjoyable, satisfying life (e.g., freedom to roam, freedom 
from pain, and life itself) may be routinely sacrificed in 
the pursuit of human happiness, provided the animals are 
not treated sadistically and are spared suffering that can 
be conveniently and economically avoided. Thus, the 
anti-cruelty to animals tradition continues to consider and 
treat animals as fundamentally resources for human 
consumption, limiting moral concern to the humane 
handling and processing of those resources. On the other 
hand, "liberating" animals refers to putting an end to the 
routine sacrifice of animal interests for human benefit, 
even where the sacrifice is executed humanely. 
Animal liberationists emphasize respecting the 
interests of animals themselves, as opposed to being solely 
or even primarily concerned with the interests that 
humans have in using animals. The primary purpose of 
extending moral rights to animals would be to ensure that 
their interests could be sacrificed for fulfilling the 
interests of others only in the sorts of situations and 
according to the sorts of principles which justify 
sacrificing the interests of some humans to fulfill the 
interests of others. For example, just as current 
regulations basically restrict risky medical research on 
humans to experiments which seem likely not only to 
benefit the wider community but also to be therapeutic (or 
otherwise beneficial) for the research subjects themselves, 
so the extension of moral rights to animals would 
basically limit risky medical research on animals to 
experiments which would have a good chance of being 
therapeutic (or otherwise beneficial) for the animal 
subjects of that research. Such a restriction would, of 
course go far beyond even the most liberal of our current 
humane regulations concerning the use and sacrifice of 
animals in biomedical research, and its adoption would 
mark a revolutionary step beyond our anti-cruelty to 
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animals tradition. 
Thus, talk of "liberating" animals and extending 
moral "rights" to them refers to changing our attirude 
toward animals from one which regards them as beings 
which must be treated humanely but which are, 
nonetheless, fundamentally resources for fulfilling human 
interests to an attitude which regards animals as fellow 
beings whose interest in an enjoyable, satisfying life must 
be respected and protected in the way basic human 
interests are respected and protected. In this way. 
liberating animals would require changing our attitude 
toward animals in basically the same way liberating 
blacks and women requires changing the attitudes 
concerning them held by whites and men. 
Another source of misunderstanding lies in the use of 
the phrase "equal rights" when discussing animal 
liberation. As already noted, animal liberationists 
routinely deny that they are seeking for animals the same 
set of rights already enjoyed by humans. Recognizing 
that rights are tied to interests and that animals do not 
have all the interests we do (e.g., in religion and 
education) animal liberationists recognize that it would be 
nonsensical to seek for animals all the rights we require. 
For example, Roger W. Galvin, the attorney who 
prosecuted the famous Taub case, proposes the following 
rights for animals: 1) all sentient beings have a right to 
live out their lives according to nature; 2) all sentient 
beings have a right to live in a habitat ecologically 
sufficient for normal existence; and 3) all sentient beings 
have a right to be free from exploitation (Newsmagazine 
of the Animal Rights Network). These are sufficiently 
different from our "Bill of Rights" and "Declaration of 
the Universal Rights of Man" to make clear that animal 
liberationists are not seeking extensional equality of rights 
for animals. 
It might be thought that what animal liberationists are 
seeking is completely equal priority of rights for animals. 
For example, it has been suggested that animal 
liberationists would feel an obligation to show no 
preference for feeding starving children over feeding 
starving dogs. However, once again matters are not 
nearly so simple. First of all, assertions of equal rights 
do not entail completely equal priority even among 
humans. For instance, people who believe that men, 
women and children have equal moral standing have, 
nonetheless, commonly believed that women and children 
should be given priority in an emergency. And 
conversely, no one would suggest that if we hold the 
traditional belief that women and children are entitled to 
first place in the lifeboats, consistency requires us to 
conclude that they would be justified in using men as 
research tools, eating them for dinner, and hunting them 
for sport. 
We cannot infer from the principles used when we 
are forced to choose the lesser of two evils to the 
principles of moral status in force when such a hard 
choice is not required. Such emergency principles are 
invoked not as extensions of common moral principles, 
but as auxiliaries needed because those common principles 
do not provide satisfactory guidance in these uncommon 
situations. This distinction of ordinary from 
extraordinary cases in morality undercuts the many 
"burning building," "desert island," "lifeboat," etc., 
supposed reducrios of the animal liberation position. That 
animals' lives could justifiably be sacrificed in preference 
to human lives in certain situations where such a hard 
choice had to be made, does not entail that their lives can 
(morally) be routinely sacrificed to support our eating 
habits, clothing preferences, entertainment, reluctance to 
control the size of our own population, unwillingness to 
adopt healthier ways of life, desire to avoid certain risks, 
etc. Consequently, such "them or us" cases are logically 
isolated and insignificant for the animal liberation debate, 
since that debate is primarily concerned with the 
principles governing our ordinary moral practice. 
Thus, animal liberation seeks neither to extend to 
animals the same set of rights enjoyed by humans nor to 
deny that human life can have a greater moral worth than 
animal life. Rather, animal liberationists contend that just 
as · it would be immoral to follow Swift's "modest 
proposal" routinely (and avoidably) to sacrifice some 
people' s interest in life in order to fulfill others' interest 
in food, so it should be immoral routinely (and avoidably) 
to sacrifice animals' interest in life for such purposes 
(Swift 1729). Of course, what is and what is not 
"avoidable" will always be a slippery issue. The animal 
liberation literature suggests that, roughly, "avoidable" 
here means "eliminable without severely compromising 
the general welfare. " For example, it is repeatedly 
emphasized in this literature that a vegetarian diet can be 
a healthy, appetizing one, that we can both keep warm 
and be ostentatious without furs, and that we can enjoy 
the wilderness without bunting. I am unaware of any 
animal liberationist saying something like, "We must 
liberate animals, even if that means an end to human 
civilization!" It should go without saying that issues of 
what is and what is not avoidable can become quite 
complex and must (logically) be decided on a case by case 
basis. What is important to the general animal liberation 
position is that the burden of proof is to be on those who 
would sacrifice animal interests for the general welfare, 
just as it is on those who would sacrifice the interests of 
some humans to help other humans (e.g., in time of war), 
and that justification requires demonstrating not merely 
some marginal increase in utility through the sacrifice but, 
rather, requires demonstrating both that prohibiting the 
sacrifice would severely compromise the general welfare 
(which is not to be restricted to human welfare) and that 
the sacrifice is distributed fairly. 
It is in thus sharing legal and moral protections 
against the routine, avoidable sacrifice of one's interests 
that animal liberation seeks "equal rights" for animals. 
PART II: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SCIENTIFIC 
STUDY OF NATURE TO ANIMAL LIBERATION 
One of the traditions of response to the animal 
liberation movement has been to portray it as the product 
of ignorance. Sometimes this is supposed to be ignorance 
of the nature of morality; sometimes it is supposed to be 
ignorance of how animals are actually treated in 
laboratories or on farms; sometimes it is supposed to be 
ignorance of the order of nature. For example, in a 
recent article entitled, "The natural wrongs about animal 
rights and animal liberation," Randall S. Ott, writes: 
"The beliefs espoused by animal rightists/liberationists are 
in conflict with scientific knowledge about the place of all 
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animals, including the human animal, in the biosphere" 
(Journal of American Veterinary Medical Assoc. 1995). 
Ott' s claim is that science teaches us that all forms of life 
are in a struggle for the survival of the fittest , are living 
off one another in biotic communities, and that ideas of 
liberating animals are in conflict with such teachings. Is 
this so? 
One of the well-established principles of moral 
philosophy is that "ought implies can." According to this 
principle, it would be nonsensical to say that we ought to 
do something, if it is not possible for us to do it. For 
example, a commandment that instructed us to live 
without breathing would be nonsensical, simply because 
we cannot do that. Moral imperatives are supposed to 
give us practical guidance; that is, to direct us toward 
doing what we can to make the world a better place. 
Consequently, proposed values which conflict with natural 
law, and therefore with what is physically possible, can 
have no place in actual moral practice. 
Now, is it the case that animal liberation directs us to 
do things we cannot do? For instance, is it physically 
impossible for us to stop sacrificing animals in biomedical 
research? Is it physically impossible for us to stop 
factory farming animals? Is it physically impossible for 
us to stop sport hunting and trapping animals? The 
answer to these questions is that it is obviously possible 
for us to stop exploiting animals in these ways. While 
the law of gravity may prevent us from levitating 
ourselves just by wishing to do so, no law of evolutionary 
natural selection or ecological holism makes it impossible 
for us to stop exploiting animals in these ways. Since 
there are many people leading healthy, satisfying, 
reproductive lives who, for religious or ethical reasons, 
consciously avoid exploiting animals, it is mind-boggling 
that anyone would even think of saying that it is 
impossible for us to liberate animals from human 
exploitation. Anyone making such a preposterous claim 
must be woefully-and perhaps willfully-ignorant of the 
diverse ways in which people choose to live. 
Since the advent of modem science, it has been 
common for some moralists to recommend patterning 
morality after science. In the 18th century, the science to 
emulate was physics, in the 19th century was biology, and 
in the latter half of the 20th century the science of 
ecology has become a candidate for moral paradigm. All 
such programs to transform morality into a science are 
logically doomed to failure for two reasons. The first is 
that, to cite a famous slogan, "you cannot derive an ought 
from an is." The second is that it is the function of moral 
imperatives to counterbalance natural tendencies. 
A basic principle of logic is that any idea asserted in 
the conclusion of a valid argument must have some 
evidence to support it in the premises of that argument. 
It follows that any argument in which all the premises 
concern matters of fact, that is, concern the way things 
are, cannot justify a conclusion about the way things 
ought to be, precisely because the idea of oughr to is not 
found in any of the premises. An argument of the form, 
"Driving bamboo shoots under people's fingernails causes 
them excruciating pain; therefore, we should not do that" 
is invalid, unless some sort of unstated, imperative 
premise, such as "We should not cause people 
excruciating pain," which contains the idea should not is 
included. Thus, while the facts and principles discovered 
by science can be of immense help in accomplishing our 
moral goals, moral values can never follow just from 
scientific discoveries, and moral philosophy can never 
become an empirical science. 
Turning to the second reason why morality cannot be 
a natural science, this is because we turn to morality 
precisely because we find our natural inclinations wanting. 
If by natural instinct we always did, or even just 
attempted to do, those things which would make the world 
a better place, we would have no need of moral 
imperatives to do this rather than that. Presumably, 
angels do not have to be commanded to respect the rights 
of others, for they have no inclination to do other than 
love others. We humans have aggressive, domineering, 
selfish, greedy, violent, and other inclinations which lead 
us routinely to destroy the well-being of others, humans 
as well as animals. We have elaborated and teach moral 
rules in an attempt to inhibit those destructive tendencies. 
Consequently, moral values never arise merely from a 
study of the way things are; they always arise from a 
study which includes projections of what would be a 
better world than the way things are. 
Thus, the function that natural science can fulfill for 
morality is not and can never be that of establishing what 
is morally right and wrong. It can establish boundaries 
for moral imperatives by determining what it is physically 
possible for us to do, but this function is seldom 
important, since moralists seldom, if ever, command 
people to do what is physically impossible. Certainly, no 
animal liberationist of my acquaintance commands us to 
do what we cannot do. It does not follow, however, that 
because natural science cannot dominate morality, it has 
no function to perform for morality. 
Another famous phrase is that, "the best laid plans of 
mice and men often go astray." Sometimes they go astray 
because people did not understand how to get where they 
were going. Morality is a program of trying to get 
somewhere, namely, to a better world. Understanding the 
way the world is, what forces have led to its being the 
way it is, what forces are available for changing it, and 
what forces obstruct such changes are all important factual 
understandings for those who would improve the world. 
For example, understanding why men want to dominate 
women, the different forms that tendency can take, what 
sorts of behavioral and pharmacological strategies are 
effective at inhibiting that tendency, and what the side 
effects of those strategies are, are all important 
understandings for someone who seeks effectively and 
without generating even greater problems to reduce the 
incidence of men battering women. People who espouse 
moral ideals but who do not learn the facts needed to 
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work effectively toward those ideals will be ineffective at 
best and are actually likely to cause a great deal of harm 
in their ignorant pursuit of good. 
In the case of animal liberation, natural science can 
help us understand, first of all, what actually causes 
animal suffering and what may appear to do so but 
actually does not. For example, some animals like to 
cluster, so that confining them in areas that seem 
overcrowded from our perspective does them no harm. 
Similarly, natural science can help us find effective ways 
to relieve animal suffering. Again, science can help us 
find alternatives which satisfy our needs without 
exploiting animals. Finally, natural science objectively 
directed at ourselves could help us understand why we are 
inclined to exploit animals and what could be effective 
strategies for controlling the destructive expressions of 
those inclinations. For instance, why is it that some 
people enjoy killing animals, and what can be done to 
cure them of this disease? 
In all areas of human endeavor, moral and otherwise, 
factual knowledge is useful for reaching the goals we 
seek. It is regrettable that well-meaning people 
sometimes waste valuable time and energy trying to make 
the world a better place, but failing to do so because they 
do not understand the natural forces which make the 
world the way it is and which need to be controlled in 
order to make it a better place. Animal liberationists 
need to inform themselves about natural science in order 
to be effective, just as morally concerned natural 
scientists need to inform themselves about logic and moral 
philosophy in order to understand how moral values 
originate and how moral reasoning works. 
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